By Danny Steed
This booklet lines the actions of the key Intelligence carrier (SIS/MI6) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in the course of the Suez difficulty, probably the most notorious episodes of British overseas coverage. In doing so it identifies broader classes not just in regards to the occasions of 1956, yet concerning the position of intelligence in method itself. It offers either an exploration of the connection among intelligence and technique on the conceptual point, and in addition a old account, and strategic research of, the functionality of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the key Intelligence provider in this time. concentrating on the interval instantly prior to, in the course of, and after the drawback, Danny Steed brings jointly a whole photo of intelligence tale in Britain that has to this point eluded entire remedy within the Suez historiography. via wide session of declassified archival resources, a re-evaluation of frequently spoke of resources, and the employment of oral heritage, this research identifies the main major classes concerning the use of intelligence published by means of the Suez Crisis.
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157. 5. 491. ), The Missing Dimension: Governments and 42 D. STEED 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 6. 195–196. 29. 201. Fingar stands alone in recognising the role of intelligence at the stage of implementing policy. 122. 54. Colin S. Gray, ‘Concept Failure? COIN, Counterinsurgency, and Strategic Theory’, Prism (2012) Vol. 3, No. 29 (italics added). 182. The list is as potentially endless as it is variable to the context in which planners find themselves. Gray gives an account of the importance of context in Colin S.
9. 10. 11. Glees and Davies accept the ‘essentially political nature’ of the relationship, but they differ to this thesis by declaring that the relationship between the operating organs of government and intelligence is difficult to clarify because of the need for intelligence to serve two masters: the politicians and the truth. J. 21. Christopher Andrew Richard J. , Secret Intelligence: A Reader (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), p. Xv. Loch K. Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence’, Comparative Strategy (2003) Vol.
This leaves MCDP-2: Intelligence of the US Marine Corps as the closest that any theoretical analysis has come to the true nature of the strategy–intelligence relationship. 26 D. ’24 Yet this last quote reveals the limitation of the US Marine Corps’ understanding, the only genuine weakness of MCDP-2: it is a work produced for American marines, to aid the conduct of their operations, and thus it only focuses on the operational level down to tactics. Understanding of the full nature of intelligence is consequently incomplete; ultimately it only comprehends the relationship of intelligence to the military commander, not to the political leadership as well.
British Strategy and Intelligence in the Suez Crisis by Danny Steed